Thursday, September 25, 2008
Review: Anana In Damascus
It seems one of our fellow Iraqi bloggers is generating something of a buzz, but in the Arab media for a change. Artist and blogger Sundus Abdilhadi made headlines in Elaph, and later tonight in al-Arabiya.net's website for her controversial painting "Inana in Damascus", which depicts a naked Iraqi woman standing in a crowd outside a nightclub called 'Al-Hirmann' (loose translation, Deprivation), the crowd includes a man in a Gulf attire who appears to be petting her, and also an American soldier who watches nonchalantly.
Now that I've finished reporting, let me have my own analysis of the painting, I'm a total layman in regards to paintings (especially ones in the style of Miss Abdulhadi) and I can never get why so-and-so is supposed to be great, but I'm the sort of the guy who likes to think of every work of art as having more than mere face value, details that reveal themselves with each repeated look or listen.
The painting is based on an Orientalist painting called the "Slave Market" by Jean-Pierre Gerome:
I recounted somewhere in this blog that I used to try to incorporate some Pan-Arab resistance motifs in my imaginary heavy metal shows, I didn't really believe in any of it, and the only reason I did so is because I wanted to be heard and get famous, in another word, I was being exploitative. This painting can be held with a similar accusation, all it did was cast the crowd with the appropriate roles, an American soldier being forced in for good measure, and there you go.
However, a more in-depth view reveals several details that in my opinion clears Abdulhadi of that crime, while Gerome's painting seems to be concerned more with painting just for the sake of painting, in regards to the subject matter, it is completely neutral, the painting does not say anything other than brillianly recreating the incident it is portraying, life is frozen appropreitely in majesty and as always the painting celebrates the female body and lighting is made to reflect that.
Abdulhadi's version is quite different, its main objective is not painting per se, but commentary, heavy depression prevades the entire picture and girl's body is unimportant, what's important is the hypocrisy implied in the addition of the far-away minarets, or the supposed dignity and valor in the attire of the Gulf man, or the leering guy in the background, however the US soldier does sound forced, and America's invovlement should have been incorporated some other way, the impact is made more significant when one looks at the Gerome and realizes the concept of men gathering around a naked woman illustrates the fact that women are still treated more or less as sex-objects 150 years later. Moreover, Abdulhadi's style renders the entire populace in a primitive, inhuman allure that strips humanity away and shows them as the vassals for ideas they're supposed to be.
Having said that, this explicit commentary still hurt the painting as a work of art, I would gladly hang the first in my living room and look at it every other Friday, but this one is just too political and too obvious to be touching in any meaningful way. It is indeed hard to be creative and find a genuinely original portrayal of the devastation of war and the hypocrisy of men, and because there is no high-resolution version of the painting anywhere online, I couldn't really examine it as closely as I wanted. But the added ideas and detail does suggest that Miss Abdulhadi has the potential to surprise us with something in her future attempts. (and for the record, this is my least favorite of her paintings, you should check out her blog for that, the title of her blog looks great)
Wednesday, September 24, 2008
What Every John and Lucy Should Know About Mithal al-Alusi
by Ibn al-Hawazin Aboosi
LAST WEEK
I barely have time to settle in my seat at the annoyingly plush Pastiche Café before Sayyid Hayder al-Khoei, taking a puff from his peppermint-orange nargeela, asks me concernedly whether I have seen the bravura in the Iraqi parliament-of-sorts concerning al-Alusi's visit to Israel. I'm sure all of you have heard the long and short of Al-Alusi's sin, for the hermits on the moon it suffices to say that Mr. Alusi made a stop at Jewtown, came back to Muslms-R-Us and got an expected upheaval culminating in a revocation of diplomatic immunity.
It is pretty amazing that there still exists a person in Iraq such as al-Alusi, who can have the admiration of such sectarian-ly disparate people such as me and Mr. al-Khoei, if we were to play strictly by the rules of modern-day new-fangled democratic Iraq™, then I hail from the devoutly Saddamist Adhamiya, he the grandson of a late Shi'i World Leader ; we have every reason to poison each other's nargeelas while smiling smugly for the cameras, and even though I could be described as something of a new convert to irreligiousness, Sayyid Haider is very conservative [and married, at 20! good luck!] granted, both of us are decidedly secular, and pretty much share a similar view regarding almost everything political ; However, I have seen many supposedly levelheaded people who eventually went with the tide and embraced the sectarian identity they felt they had to choose, too many, in fact, which caused the current confessional parliament to be installed in place. I myself have made that mistake and voted for the Sunni 618 bloc back in 2005, if you remember correctly, I was too afraid and felt nobody is speaking about those horrible Badr murders, except Harith al-Dhari, with such heroes becoming sectarian is eventual, and it's a hard thing to truly shed sectarianism, it took the death of my friends to truly realize its folly.
WHY I LIKE AL-ALUSI
There are many secular Iraqi politicians in the vein of al-Alusi, but none of them seem to appeal to such a diverse margin of Iraqis as al-Alusi, I do believe it largely has to do with one thing alone: he has guts and showmanship. Al-Alusi blasts Arab dictators with unwavering condemnation and disgust at their despotism and double-standards, he doesn’t hold a thread of reverence for Saddam Hussein, and he never ignores his crimes disrespectfully in the vein of virtually all Sunni politicians. Yet this hostility does not seem to be fueled by racist anti-Arab orientations in the vein of certain Shi'i polemics, but more because of the backwardness of those systems of government. He is straightforward, dashing and explicit. Just look at his party title "The Iraqi Ummah Party", the choice of phrase is significant because nobody dares to voice the view that Iraq as a 'nation' (Ummah) by itself in such a flamboyant manner, basically, no Arab country ever uses the phrase 'Ummah' except when it describes the Arab Nation, the Arab countries are mere 'republics' or 'states', parts of the whole, and this is yet another substantial portion of al-Alusi's maxims, the underlying suggestion in his party's title is that Iraqi Ummah is something quite separate from the Arabic Ummah, an uneasy thing to sell (other examples include Phoenician Lebanon and Pharaonic Egypt). But what sets al-Alusi's Ataturkian ambitions aside is that he doesn't seem to have much stock to invest in all those theories that attempt to link Sumerians to modern-day Iraqi Arabs, which often has very hostile anti-Arab connotations, again , al-Alusi seem to be driven in that direction out of practicality ; Skipping questions regarding the validity of an "Iraqi identity", al-Alusi embraces it unquestioningly and by embracing Iraq as the foremost homeland, he seeks to follow a program that can successfully reflect the desires of the entire spectrum of "Iraqis", bypassing Sunni and Shi'i identification and for the first time truly treating everyone equally ; it doesn't take a while to figure out that undertaking the mission of building a truly stable Iraqi identity where religion occupies second place is not necessarily in the interest of the tyrannical Sunni Arab countries that surround it, who have helped fuel the sectarian war alongside Shi'i Iran, all sides would not benefit from a strong non-aligned Iraq rising from the ashes. Therefore, Al-Alusi's only reasonable partner is the West. His unnecessary showmanship in visiting Israel publicly seems to solely convey this explicit fuck-you approach to Pan-Arabism and Pan-Sectarianism, he says this to Iraqis: I am of a different breed.
ARAB UNITY
This approach is appealing, while I identify as an Arab, and have nothing personal against fellow Arabs, but the interference of Arabs in Iraq has always been misguided and negative, completely oblivious to what Iraqis want, and is as harmful as Iranian interference.
This Mithal al-Alusi stint led me thinking a lot about the proper position and identity we must have, between Iraq, the Arabs, Palestine and America. Until very recently, I had a soft spot for Arab Unity, but on thinking it over I've come to the conclusion that its best we worry about forming an Iraqi identity first before pondering ideas of what is in the interest of "Arabs". The idea of childishly integrating vast countries together with vastly different economic, cultural and religious values seems only to have much weight in sentimentality.
On the other hand, a shot at an "Iraqi" identity, however muddled and baseless historically that identity is, is quite possible. Indeed, it is known that Iraqi Shia and Palestinians share a mutual hatred, but are Sunni Iraqis any more loving of other Sunni countries? I've never met an Iraqi Sunni who identified with non-Iraqi Arabs more than he identified with his Shi'i countrymen. If anything, the similarities between Sunni and Shi'i Iraqis suggest it to be more doable than, say, a union between Sunni Jordan and Sunni Palestine.
REACTIONS AROUND THE WEB:
Hardcore Baathist Iraqirabita.org launched a petition to 'revoke the Iraqi nationality from Dirtbag Mithal', out of 5226 readers, only 432 have signed.
SIIC's unofficial news agency Burathanews.com was naturally scathing. Publishing opinion pieces and articles against al-Alusi.
Saudi-based liberal website Elaph has an interesting 4-part eyewitness account that praises al-Alusi's overall goals but includes several important criticisms, describing him as willing to impose democracy and the concept of an "Iraqi nation" by force and describing the people around him as opportunists. Most commentators favored al-Alusi.
Commentators on al-Arabiya.net's news item regarding al-Alusi's stunt was overwhelmingly and surprisingly positive, predictably, the ones who were negative were either Arabs or ultra-fundies. Maybe there is hope after all.
Angry Arab provides a great rude example of why Arabs could be harmful to Iraq, he predictably looks at Mithal al-Alusi, who he probably has never heard of before, through the prism of Palestine ; This one-dimension worldview can wear off quicker than you might imagine, what might be good for Palestine doesn't necessarily translate to be good for Iraq, and after all, the Iraqi problem is by and large unrelated to the actions of Western entities, which is why Arabs are having a hard time tackling it, all America did is bring it all to the surface.
Secular website Kitabat.com launched an uncharacteristically mouth-frothing campaign against the parliament, descending to a comedic vocabulary so typical of Baathists as personified by al-Sahaf. There were some anti-Alusi articles thrown in for good measure, but there is a great article contributed by German-based Iraqi politician Dhiaa al-Shakarchi, a former Dawa member who resigned from the party having seen the horrors of [political] Islamism, he is currently a secular Muslim, and he manages to sum up my feelings very eloquently:
Yes, perhaps I do not interact with the Palestinian cause as an Islamic cause, I view it as Palestinian first, humanitarian second, and perhaps Arab third.
Yet as we sympathize with the rights of the Palestinian people, we condemn as Iraqis the inexplicable support by radical Arab and Islamist Palestinian movements and its popular bases to the enemies and murderers of the Iraqi people, starting from Saddam and his sons and ending with al-Zarqawi and al-Qaeda. We also condemn the Iranian interference in the Iraqi, Palestinian and Lebanese affairs, and we would not exaggerate should we say that Iran played the most corrosive part in Iraq's destruction, but that does not make other regional and international sides innocent. The foremost international partner would naturally involve condemning fatal US mistakes in Iraq, but I would not look at America as an enemy, in fact I support a friendship that maintains the sovereignty and security of Iraq's democratic project to protect it against Iran's corrosive action and the radicalized factions of Islamists and those with a sectarian political agenda, but if it is clear to us that there is an American conspiracy against the aspirations of Iraqi people then we must surely adopt an entirely different position, albeit balancing the strength of our national convictions with political realities at hand.
As of Mithal al-Alusi's recent visit to Israel, one must say that the man managed, through unparalleled courage to present through his media appearances a political discourse with an effective and distinct national flavor, especially with his equally damning condemnations of Sunni sectarian terrorists and Shii sectarian agents. However, this does not mean we support his visit to Israel, an action that is surely a horrible political mistake committed without the slightest reasonable justification.
Perhaps the man had certain calculations we are unaware of, and it is not unlikely that the predictable uproar swings from the political fall from grace everyone is betting on to a sizable popular base in his favor, especially if we take into consideration that the figures who attacked al-Alusi in parliament are disliked by a great majority of Iraqis, as they are the figureheads of political powers that seek to establish sectarian politics and are often accused of being complicit with Iran. Thus many Iraqis who reject those political powers might support al-Alusi against those forces as an exhibition of their disappointment.
Sotaliraq.com publishes the results of a poll that might confirm some of the things al-Shakarchi talked about:
Do you think parliament must remove immunity from any Iraqi MP that visited or shook hands with an Israeli official? (No 76%, Yes 24%)
Should Iraq fight Israel in place of Arabs and Palestinians? (No 90% Yes 10%)
There are three Facebook groups in support of al-Alusi, the largest has members in the 500+ 750 apx, which is impressive considering Iraqis slow apprecation of Facebook. (it was 500 two days ago)
One can definitely be skeptical about al-Alusi, in the end of the day one can say so much without really having to do something. And the enormity of realizing that identifying with Iraq might necessitate an isolationist policy is not something easy to accomplish. However, taken at face value, al-Alusi seems to promise something, he is undertaking a great risk with what he's doing and he has already lost two sons in the process. He has my full support.
Thursday, September 11, 2008
Karfan's View Of A Sectarian Syria
A significant theme in Karfan's classic 13-posts blog is sectarainism,Other highly recommended Karfan posts that discuss sectarainism frankly and openly include the posts "Myth No. 5: We Will Slaughter Each Other" and "Myth No. 2 : We Have An Identity"
Myth No. 6 : Alawie Is Still A Religious Sect
It might be very surprising for many people to know that the Alawie (the sect that the ruling thugs belong to) is the most oppressed religion in Syria!! Of course in terms of ideology not in terms of the status of the people belonging to it.
"King Lion the 1st" long ago realized how much he relies on the support of his sect to stay in power, and realized who much dangerous would be to rely on something that can be easily manipulated such as religion. He then diverted this lurking danger to his rule by imposing an overwhelming Sunnification policy on the very Alawie sect that supported him. This extreme policy took the shape of so many aspects that everybody here knows very well:
Introducing only pure Sunni Islam education to all schools;
Banning any public manifestation or even mentioning of any Alawie religious activities;
Banning and oppressing any Alawie religious organizations or any formation of a unified religious council or a higher religious authority; Many were killed by the great gangster Duba for starting to utter such ideas among people in Tartous and Jableh;
Building Sunni-style mosques in every little Alawie village and encouraging people to perform the pilgrimage through public and private (his late brother's Hadjee Jameel) organizations;
Encouraging the Late Grand Mufti of Syria to brake down any attempt to present the Alawie religion as anything but a bad old mistake which people should renounce and forget.
Releasing the hands of the Sunni clerks to do whatever they whish regarding establishing a clear religious identity to all Sunni youth, and facilitating Sunni Islam educational and media sources (as long as it does not tackles politics and the King’s eternal right to his crown) while banning any sort of similar activities for Alawies and other minor sects. There are in Syria hundreds of Sunni religious schools while there is not a single school that is specialized in teaching not even the history of the Alawie sect.
etcetera etcetera...
"King Lion the 1st" managed even to convince many Alawies, especially young generations, that they are actually just Bad Muslims, someway or another.
"King Lion the 1st" and the rest of the gang around him knew well that this is not going to lead to any real results in term of unifying the Alawie sect with the main stream Sunni Islam. Everybody knows, especially those Alawies who tried very hard to integrate with their Sunni surroundings after moving to the main cities, that they will never be accepted by the Sunnis. There isn't a single Alawie house in Damascus without a story or two on failed experiences in... what you may name: go out of own skin attempts. Alawies are still bad Muslims, the mosques the government built are still deserted, and the number of Alawie-Sunni "mixed marriages" is even much lower than the number of the mixed marriages between Syrians and foreigners. Of course excluding the upper class mixed marriages, where the thugs marry into each other's families for the sole reason of solidifying their rule.
The Sunni-fication attempt did not work simply because it was not meant to work in the first place. While "King Lion the 1st" and his thugs were trumpeting this integration policy, they were at the same time systematically building a culture of separation and segregation between Alawies and Sunnis, and between all sects and ethnic and religious groups in Syria for that matter.
The real reason behind this policy was never integration with Sunnis or establishing an acceptance for the Alawies by the Sunnis. The real reason was to deprive the Alawies from any solid unified religious ideology that might one day pause a fatal danger on the rule of the King. To turn them into meaningless tribes ranked by how much they support the King.
Let Karfan explain this in his simple words: Imagine what the King's position would be if all the Alawies in the Republican Guard, Special Forces, and Security Services (all composed of 95%Up Alawies) told him to go fuck-him-self because an Alawie higher religious authority decided it is not in the sect's best interest to support him anymore? What exactly do you think this regime is hold together by? Baathis? That is the biggest joke that every five year old Syrians knows. Everybody here knows that these forces are the regime real power which prevents any opposition from even pondering on the idea of opposing publicly. The army in general has been long ago marginalized and made weak to have any real effect on the power balance. That was when many army units refused to carry out "King Lion the 1st" 's destruction plans against the Sunnis at the time when the regime and the Muslim Brothers were waging holly wars against each other. Many army officers who refused orders were fired and are still sitting in their houses doing nothing since. But that experience taught the King that he had better rely on very well organized, brain-washed, and loyal smaller units such as the infamous "Sarya Eldefaa" of his brother who eventually carried out the attacks on Hama. Since then, he learned how to balance these power tools by multiplying them into several separate entities: Republican Guard, Special Forces, and many strong Security Services Units. Those units are where the real military power of the regime exists.
Such essential power centers should be kept under the sole control of the King. That is why, unlike the Sunnis or Druuz or Smaeilis, the Alawies were doomed not have a religion in fear that this religion or whoever controls it might be in control of these essential power centers one day.
By erasing all sort of religious identity while making sure that Alawies will not find another one elsewhere, Alawies were simply transformed into a sort of tribes that are unified around one purpose: Keeping the King in Power. A couple of tribes that does not have any real religious conviction or ideology but are hold together by the fear of the others and the fear of revenge by the others for the regimes deeds. A sort of army units which sole purpose is to protect the leader, nothing else.
Meanwhile every one around them keep labeling the regime an "Alawie Regime" and keep throwing all the faults that this regime did on the Alawies shoulders. We will be doomed to carry the burden of the faults of the same people who destroyed our religion and destroyed any religious identity we might have had. The same people who instead of seizing the chance of being on top to establish a real secular society were all would be respected regardless of what they believe in, they encouraged Sunni extreme religious teachings and built a society were you have only two books to read: Ibn Taymeiya, or Michael Aflak.
After this systematic destruction of any unified religious authority, it seems unlikely that Alawies would bring themselves together to get rid of the gang ruling in their name and destroying the future of this country in their name. What makes it even more difficult is the accusations that the other sects keep building: An Alawie Regime, An Alawie Baath etc.. to the end of the list of everything bad+Alawie. Not a single opposition group had come forward to present a vision or an idea of what would be their stance on the thousands of Alawies serving in the Security Services and army. What should Alawies expect if they actually manage to realize that the ruling thugs are going to destroy what is left of the other's trust in them? No one is saying anything about that: Sunnis are vague or just silent at best, and that is what the King exactly whishes for. With no bright future, Alawies are just maintaining the present, no matter how bad it is.
The Alawie sect had suffered hundreds of years of oppression and negligence before, but the biggest harm to it came when one of it's own followers controlled the country! He succeeded in doing what long Sunni oppression and mighty Osman Emperors couldn't do over hundred of years: erasing the Alawie religion and turning its followers into an identity-less supporters of his rule.
One day the King and his gang will go and he will join his uncle "White Knight of Tadmur" in France in his luxurious life style and white suits, like all ousted kings and rulers. And only the Alawie King Lion and his dynasty and thugs will remain in people's memory. People will forget all other great Alawies like Saad Allah Wannous and Nadeem Muhammad, and we will be responsible for all the backwardness of Syria and its society. Alawie will never have the right to build religious schools or demand a secular education, the majority would say: You didn't do that when you were in power, why should we do it for you now? And they will be damn right in saying that.
Alawie, as a religion or sect, no longer exists like all other sects in Syria. But Alawies have one thing in common: they are the ones who keep this regime alive. And according to Karfan there is another thing that is common between us, Alawies: We have no future, at least not one that is worth looking forward to.
Sunday, September 07, 2008
Blind Man From Ma'rra أعمى المعرة
هفت الحنيفةُ والنصارى ما اهتدت ويهود حارت والمجوس مضللةْ
إثنان أهل الأرض ، ذو عقل بلا دين، واخر دين لا عقل له
- They all err - Moslems, Christians, Jews, and Magians:
- Two make Humanity's universal sect:
- One man intelligent without religion,
- And, one religious without intellect.
The Baathist Model in Iraq and Syria
"Syria is a beautiful country." This is the first line Riverbend wrote in her last blogpost, of course, she quickly followed it by: "at least, I think it is." The addition is necessary because Syria is not beautiful in the modernized sense of Western civilization, its streets are dirty, the electricity cuts off an hour everyday, and autocracy assures you of its dominance in every inch of the streets. Riverbend attempts to explain her impression by saying that as an Iraqi she persumes she'd take safety and security as beautiful no matter what, but I feel this analysis to be in error*. 'Amman is significanly more pretty, chic and advanced in services and architecture than Damascus, but, in the words of an Algerian reporter I met last year "it has no soul", Damascus has loads of cultural (old city) historical(Umyyads) and natural soul(Qasiyoon), but most importantly, it resembles pre-war Iraq almost unbelievably.
Which brings us to the main point: the extra time allowed me to ponder a comparison I've tried to make ever since my first trip to Syria, to count the similarities between Baathist Syria and Baathist Iraq.
| ########### | | |
| | 1932 | 1947 |
| Flag (Longest Surviving) | ||
| Population | 29 million - ([this year] – 2003) x 1 million) | 19.4 million |
| Ruling Party | وحدة مرية اشترا كبة | وحدة مرية اشترا كبة |
| State Constitution | 20% Sunni rules 60% Shia, Other minorities favor the 'secular' rule of the minority against the Islamic tendencies of the majority. | 10% Alawi rules 74% Sunni, other minorities act the same as Iraq's. |
| Demographics | Shii (Imami), Sunni, Kurds, Turkmen, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Armenians, Mandaeans, Yazidis, Shabak. | Sunni, "Shii" Alawi, Shii Imami, Shii Ismaili, Druze, Kurds, Turkmen, Assyrians, Armenians. |
| Things That Make 9/11 Look Silly | Halabja (3,000) (Sunni Arabs vs Kurds) 91 Uprising (180,000) (Sunni vs Shia) Anfal (50,000)* (Sunni Arabs vs Kurds) | |
| Government Sponsored Edutainment | Abu Gharib Prisons | Tadmur |
| Claims To Fame | | Oldest City In World, |
| Caliphates | | |
Death Counts are listed at their maximum for both
The most interesting part of this comparison to me is the sectarian model of government, theoretically, the model is almost identical, both countries have a minority that rules under secular guises a majority it is historically hostile to. But the regime in Syria has been relatively much more cautious and gentle in its treatment of the majority, the reluctant diplomacy of the Syrian regime in comparison to the uncompromising Iraqi brutality is a trait that exhibits itself almost everywhere you look, even in the respective heads of state, as noted by US ambassador April Glaspie. So how could we explain this? Is it just a difference of temperament between Syrians and Iraqis?
Perhaps it plays an effect, but I think an important factor lies in the identity of the dominant minority sect in either country. The orthodox faction, the Sunnis, are 85-90% of the Muslim World, and so when they ruled in Iraq they assumed a supremacy that was historically natural. All the education books (history, and religion) we studied in elementary schools were 100% Sunni, sometimes even implicitly molded to counter Shia arguments (a chapter about the strong relationship between Ali and Umar, for example) The Sunnis stubbornly refused to accept the majority percentage of Shia in Iraq, before Iraq became independent, it was always ruled, except for brief interruptions, by Sunnis. So when push comes to shove with the rise of Shi'i Islamic movements as part of the general religious awakening in the whole Muslim world, the Sunni government found no qualms in entirely suppressing all religious Shia practices. The Shia, historically and religiously attuned to suppression and tyrannical rule, did not act against this ban with the veracity one would expect from a majority oppressed in its own homeland.
and so it is only natural that the Nusayri pseudo-Shia Alawi regime in Syria would manifest its Shia identity in Syria somewhat cautiously. To the Alawis, who are a very small minority who lived in the mountains and are considered extremists by Shia themselves, this moment of rule is historically without precedent. (the magnitude of such an accomplishment can be felt when imagining Saudi Arabia ruled by its minority Shia, or Iran by its minority Sunni) and so, education in Syria remains, as this excellent report shows, traditional, rigid, and entirely Sunni. Sunni worship is accommodated graciously, even after the Muslim Brotherhood Hama revolution and was never really made to feel actively threatened or assaulted full-on, in fact, the report goes so far as to say that Alawis have traded their religion for political power, effectively becoming Orthodox Sunnis, attempting a process of integration in the pan-Arab identity which is closely intertwined with Sunni Islam (read it).But I don't really think that they've abandoned their religion entirely, instead, they are coy in pushing up their own version ; for a 10% minority, they are ubiquitous, pictures of Bashar al-Assad and Hasan Nasrallah together are a no-brainer and are visible everywhere, hell, I even saw pictures of Khomeini and Khamenei together with the words 'Leaders of the Nation' plastered next to a clothes shop, something I haven't ever seen in Iraq. When I went to help the Ba'ath Party neighborhood official who owned the apartment of my relatives install Yahoo Messenger on his computer, the first thing I saw inside his house was a large poster of Nasrallah, at the corner of the street, I encounter a young man with 'Ya Ali' tattoed on his arm, many Iranians walk the streets, Shia books are sold side-by-side next to Sunni ones in the street, Kiosks turn on Shia sermons freely...the references are endless.
The question presents itself, if for some reason America decided to do to Syria what it did for Iraq, would they end up with the same results? Would the minority, supported by an unbreakable relationship with Iran, cause the same havoc the smug, historically confident minority in Iraq did? Or would they turn back to their mountains in acceptance of their historical outcast status vis-a-vis the majority Sunni and forget about it? I don't know, maybe, but it's too costly to find out, and Iraq is the biggest proof of that.
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Sunday, August 31, 2008
Friday, August 15, 2008
Religious Holidays
Tuesday, August 12, 2008
كم صدام في تاريخ الأمة العربية المجيدة
عرب تايمز
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كاتب عراقي مقيم في الولايات المتحدة
Email: mansialtaib@yahoo.com
كم صدام في تاريخ الأمة العربية المجيدة
لم يكن (صدام بن أبيه) ، بظلمه وجوره وطغيانه ، حالة استثنائية فريدة من نوعها في تأريخ العرب والمسلمين ، بقدر ما كان كغيره من الأقزام المتفرعنة امتدادا حتميا لمن سبقه من الخلفاء والحكام والقادة العرب الذين أصبحوا في ما بعد سُنة وشريعة أعراب متبعة لمن بعدهم من اللقطاء المتكررين بنطف آبائهم المقذوفة في رحم الزمان المغتصَب.
يؤكد علماء الإجتماع الغربيون على ان الإنسان بن بيئته. وصدام لم يكن كذلك فحسب ، بل كان إبن تأريخ عربي قذر مزيف ومزور ومقلوب ومكتوب بدماء الضحايا ليجعل منهم ظالمين ومن قتلتهم مظلومين ومغبونين ومفترى عليهم!
كثيرا ما سألت نفسي هذا السؤال: ماذا كنت سأفعل لو كنت مكان صدام؟ وكنت كلما أعدت السؤال على نفسي ، يكون الجواب نفسه في كل مرة ، وهو اني سأقتل وأذبح وأعذب البشر وأدمر البلدان وأحرق الشعوب وسأفعل أكثر مما فعله صدام بنفسه وبشعبه وبأمته العربية المهزومة مادام هناك من يصفق لي ويبرر جرائمي الوحشية للعالم!
وإذا كان صدام قد اختبأ في حفرة من حفر المخازي والعار -- التي لا تليق حتى بجرذ أجرب -- هاربا من قدره فإني سأختبأ في حفرة أقذر وأحقر من حفرته ، ليس خوفا من عدوي أو فرارا من قدري لكن هربا من انتمائي لهكذا أمة عربية مريضة ترى في الجبناء أبطالا ورموزا قومية ودينية.
ومَن يحاول أن يسأل نفسه هذا السؤال وتكون إجابته مختلفة عن إجابتي ، فليحمد ربه -- أيا كان هذا الرب – لأن السائل لم يكن عربيا مثلي!
لماذا؟
قد يختلف اثنان من الأعراب حول شخصية عربية وقائد اسلامي مثل خالد بن الوليد. سيّما إذا كان المختلف الأول سنيّا يرى في خالد القائد والمجاهد وسيف الله المسلول في ميادين الذبح والسلخ واغتصاب النساء. وكان المختلف الثاني شيعيا تعوّد على الظلم والإضطهاد واللطم والبكاء واتقن فنون التقية التي يتجنب بها شر أخيه المختلف الأول في نظرته الى خالد وأمثاله من عشاق الدماء.
لكن ، ماذا لو كان خالد بن الوليد شيعيا؟
أكيد انه سيصبح سبأي مجوسي بن متعة وسيجرده التأريخ السني العربي الرخيص من السيف الذي حباه الله به لقطع رقاب البشر ، وسيجد الشيعي -- في المقابل -- لخالد ألف نص ديني يبرر له إجرامه وإرهابه وطبخه لرؤوس أعداءه في قدور الطعام ، وسيكون اغتصاب خالد بن الوليد للسيدة (ليلى) في نفس اليوم الذي قتل فيه خالد زوجها الصحابي (مالك بن نويرة) أمامها نوع من انواع المتعة المحللة في القران!
المسلم الشيعي لا يختلف كثيرا عن المسلم السني في نظرته إلى الرمز والقائد العربي الجبان بقدر ما يختلف معه في كيفية انتهاز الفرصة -- التي دائما ما يفشل فيها الشيعي -- والجلوس على عرش السلطان واستغلال كل النصوص الدينية المقدسة لصالحه الشخصي ، وحكومة اللصوص العراقية الحالية خير دليل على ذلك ، إذ ان هذه الحكومة قد وعدت العالم مجبرة بديمقراطية عراقية نموذجية تكون الأولى من نوعها في تاريخ العرب والمسلمين؟ ولا أعرف من أين كانت ستستمد هذه الحكومة تعاليم وقوانين ديمقراطيتها وهي عربية إسلامية ليس في تاريخ عروبتها الطويل من الرموز ما هو أهون في الإجرام والإرهاب من خالد والحجاج والرشيد والسفاح وصدام وغيرهم؟ وبالتالي أثبتت هذه الحكومة للعالم أنها ليست قادرة إلا على الهدم بدلا من البناء والعمران والسرقة بدلا من ارجاع حقوق المظلومين وتعويضهم، وإذلال الشعب العراقي أكثر من إذلاله في عهد الديكتاتورية السابق.
وإذا كان الشعب العراقي في السابق مظلوما ومضطهدا ومحروما من حقوقه ، فالآن مظلومية هذا الشعب أكبر وأضطهاده أكثر ونصيب حرمانه أوفر ، ولا أدري مَن هو المسؤول الحقيقي الأول عن هذا كله؟ هل هي أمريكا التي أرادت عن قصد للشعب العراقي أن يجرّب الحكم الشيعي الفاشل بعدما جرب حكم السني المستبد لأكثر من ألف وأربعمائة سنة هجرية فأورث العباد ثقافة الحزن المؤبد واللطم السنوي وسايكيلوجية الثارات المرفرفة براياتها على أعمدة الكهرباء المقطوعة منذ سنين؟
الإثنان ، الشيعي والسني ، لا يصلحان للحكم ماداما ينهلان تعاليمهما الديمقراطية المقدسة من بئر عتيق واحد ، هو بئر زمزم الذي حفره أبوهما ابراهيم الخليل الذي وُلِد في مدينة الناصرية العراقية وترك عائلته المسلمة في مكة السعودية ليذهب الى مدينة الخليل في فلسطين بعائلته اليهودية الثانية ليصبح بعد ذلك أبا دينيا لأكبر ثلاث ديانات سماوية إرهابية متناحرة في سبيل الله ، والضحية تكون دائما الشعوب المضطهدة المبتلية بتأريخ سخيف لا يمجد إلا الطغاة والقتلة والصداميين.
وكم صدام في تاريخ الأمة العربية المجيدة؟!
Thursday, August 07, 2008
Iraqi YouTube: al-Furat's Subtle Attack Ad
Anyway, don't worry about not understanding it, the bad guys at MEMRI have done all the work for you.
One thing is for sure, the complicated relationship between Iran, America and the two major Shi'i parties in Iraq is very hard to describe coherently.
Tuesday, August 05, 2008
Iraqi Atheist Resumes Blogging
A Sectarian Analysis of Yassir al-Habib's TOEFL Score
It has been taken for granted that for countless centuries, the Shia were the oppressed and the Sunni were the oppressors, however, this doesn't necessarily indicate that the Shia are anymore peaceful or tolerant than the Sunnis in any way, they simply lost the power struggle, and facing the fact of being sore losers, they settled for a vindictive agenda that was put on hold until future Terminator-Mahdi activates World Shutdown Sequence, while the Sunnis happily chopped off their heads and have rather enjoyed their sadistic tenure in power (as opposed to the Shi'i masochistic self-sacrifice) until they were put in the Losing Shi'i position of the food chain at large by the West when Napoleon washed up Egypt's shore. In fact, a world where Shia make up 90% of the Muslim world would find the Umayyad-following, Nasibi Holy-Imam-Killing sect of Sunnism in a very difficult environment that might force them to adopt many of the evasive measurements now unique to Shi'ism.
But enough What-Ifs, being only 10-15%, the Shia found no other option but to hit the mattresses and be implicit about their own takfirist impulses. This finds itself true in many manifestations, especially when comparing the accomodative role of the Shia minority in Syria and the suppressive role of the Sunni minority in Iraq, (coming up in a future post).
Because of all of this, Sheikh Yassir al-Habib is an interesting figure, he is a young cleric who has quickly gained notoriety, attained quickly by bombast and controversy, unlike virtually all Shi'is, he publicly blasphemes the companions harshly and explicitly, for which he was imprisoned in Kuwait, only to manage to seek asylum and resettle in the United Kingdom, the man is a recurring figure in many discussion forums and video sites, you might him remember as the guy who actively called for the burning and destruction of Sunni mosques following the Askariya 2006 events (although that video was edited for effect), in many ways, the extremism of his views are equivalent of the Wahhabi 'Takfiri' sheikhs who are murderously opposed to the Rafidha Shia, a class that usually summons Ibn Taymiyya alongside modern stalwarts such as Ibn Baz, Ibn Jibreen, and Salih al-Fawzan. But the rarity of extremist figures on the Shi'i side is only a matter of the careful prudent hate of the traditional Shi'i system, produced by centuries of a their perception of being oppressed. In defiance, Yassir courageously describes the Sunnis as 'unbelievers', he also complains that the Askari shrine is under the control of the 'Nawasib' (lit. Ali-haters, but here he means the Iraqi Sunni endowment) and the priority of its reclamation is more important than reclaiming Jerusalem, in fact, his default word for 'Sunnism' in this video is a dismissive 'Bakri sect'. Listening to his lectures, the whole Shi'i thing seems to be concetrated at getting sweet revenge from Umar.
So we come to ask the big question again, often asked by the larger West vis-a-vis the smaller Islam in the food chain, is this Yassir al-Haibi guy an extremist nonsensical offshoot who wants to make it big quick or are there some concrete facts that supplied this hatred and he's just being honest about it? Well, for most of the time, Sunni-Shia relations were lukewarm at best, and they only come into unison when faced by a common enemy, such as Abu Naji** in 1920s Iraq (although the intents of the various factions in that revolution comes into heavy dispute), or the general lack of interest in religion in the 60s, heydays of Pan-Arab Nasserism, which was a time when the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party would hold demonstrations in tandem with al-Hakim family against Qasim's Communists, and most spectacularly a fatwa validating the Shi'i sect by the highest Sunni authority, Egyptian al-Azhar (which, interestingly, was built by Fatimid Shia), although the Azhar hurridely distanced itself from the fatwa as time progressed and the Iranian revolution burst upon the panicked Gulf and the shit-ruined America, who both hurried to Saddam. Other than these circumstantial periods, the constant assurance that 'everything is all right' and 'we are only different by 20% or less' is made more worrying with the number of the dead piling up and the increase in extremist hysteria from both sides of the camp, all signs of a very strained hostility that is constantly emerging after being buried not-so-subtly in history books. with the Sunnis naturally being the more outspoken considering their size , their traditional dominance and their perceived loss of power. That's the only difference, as evidenced by the concentrated dose of honest hate of al-Habib as lashed out in this reactionary fashion. In this environment, which lacks any understanding of meaningful coexistence, Prophet Bush's shock-and-awe democracy won't work, so here's hoping for another miracle, (although not one as my otherwise-nice uncle suggests:
** Abu Naji = An Iraqi slang for British, what, you think your 'Haji' is original?
Thursday, July 31, 2008
Joining The Joker Jubliancy and The Baathist Superman

I hate anything that stirs a public sensation, based on my faith in humanity, the humanity that keeps asking me to add pointless Facebook applications and internet memes, the object of the ever-shifting public adoration tend to be some cutesy sold-out simplistic dumb-down, my childhood role has always been to root for the number two, PC vs Playstation, adventure games vs First Person Shooters, and of course Batman against Superman.
Batman was my favorite superhero when I was a kid, while comics were nowhere prominent in Iraq (although everybody knew who Batman is) I discovered the Caped Jihadist [Crusader is frowned upon here] at about 8, he was black-and-white in the Iraqi rip-off version of the Lebanese licensed DC Comics magazine, it was called Al-Rajul al-Khariq (lit. The Amazing Man) and they pretended Superman's name was Khariq, thankfully, Batman was spared from Saddam's Lookalike Campaign, the lesser-known campaign that was overshadowed by the Saddam-Mural-For-Every-Iraqi Campaign, this obscure fiasco consisted of making every Iraqi look like Saddam Hussein, while the Greatest Detective hid in the shadows from the Baath, the brazen Man of Steel didn't, thus Khariq sported a Thmanniya Shbaat bush (February, 8th, Iraqi slang for Baathist – from the revolution of 8 February 1963) that curiously disappeared in his Clark Kent alter-ego. I couldn't find any mention of it on the web so I approximated the effect:
(note: only the cover was colored)Wonder Woman: Superman!?!?
Superman: Something's controlling me! I can only say: Bil Rooh! Bil Dam! Nifdik Ya Saddam!!!
Batman is awesome in many ways, his costume isn't ridiculously bright, he is scary and dark but not evil, and he has satanic horns. His stories have some sort of serious edge to them, which is why he is the only one who could receive this mature treatment. My favorite Batman was the beady-eyed long-horned one in the late 70s/early 80s.
With all that in mind, I've long ago stopped reading comics (except for a nostalgia period earlier this year invoked by political comics), and have never found anything special in any of the movies at this point to rekindle my interest, when I heard about the big fuss, I suspected it was capitalizing over the death of that Ledger guy who plays the Joker, a character I furiously disliked, I've never heard of Heath Ledger before, and when I heard he starred in a film about gay cowboys eating pudding, I wasn't really that eager about him – I'm okay with the gay thing, but keep it out of every other movie/story please, so you can imagine my surprise when I found myself walking out of the The Dark Knight totally blown away.Simply put, if it wasn't for Ledger, this whole film wouldn't have registered as anything but a regular superhero outfit with some grandiose thinking-man philosophical aspirations for the sake of coloring (which is what Batman Begins was). Heath blows the big con known as Jack Nicholson's acting, which consists of simply standing there and plugging his natural charisma through every other movie (except About Schmidt, okay), Nicholson's Joker consisted of Nicholson in make-up, he was painfully unfunny, and very predictable. From this perspective, the entire
Many people have hailed this film as the first really 'real' story featuring superheroes, comparing it to crime dramas such as Heat, and they're right. This is not just a 'superhero' film.
Monday, July 28, 2008
Yousif Chahine : Another One Bites The Dust
(Hina Maysara, by Chahine's portege, is worth your attention though.)
Saturday, July 26, 2008
Baghdad Muralists Resist Push for Sectarian Themes











BAGHDAD - It's art ornamenting life: murals of soothing landscapes and historical heroes covering the blast walls that are now as much a part of Baghdad's cityscape as date palms and desert dust. The idea took off last year when Iraqi aid groups sought to provide work for young artists — and offer a bit of hope and a splash of color to a city whose signature hue is oatmeal brown. But fully rising above Iraq's sectarian suspicions has proved a challenge.
Many members in the founding group of artists are putting down their brushes to protest requests from neighborhood councils to depict politically charged sectarian themes such as Sunni shrines in Sunni districts or Shiite saints in Shiite areas.
"We'd rather refuse the work than do that," said Ali Saleem Badran, one of the original crew of muralists in the Jamaat al-Jidaar, or the Wall Group. "That is not what this work is supposed to say."
But that is what Baghdad has become: a quilt of Sunni and Shiite enclaves after years of sectarian killings and threats. While some displaced families are crossing the lines and returning to their old neighborhoods as violence ebbs, the capital may never fully regain its place as a true mixing ground for Iraq's religious and ethnic groups.
The mural project began in early 2007 when Iraqi civic groups approached aspiring and student artists, including Badran who was then in his last year of art school.
Hundreds of concrete slabs — each about 12-by-6-feet and designed to shield against car bombs and other threats — were gradually turned into an open air art gallery meant to boost spirits and kindle optimism.
It's a bit like the Baghdad version of other acts of art in the face of adversity, such as the New Deal-funded murals during the Depression or the tangle of messages and figures on the western face of the Berlin Wall.
But rumbles started a few months ago, Badran said, when the program was transferred from loose government oversight to neighborhood councils that began suggesting sectarian images.
Many of the original artists have refused to take part. Local dabblers have often taken up the slack with less refined — but still potent — references to either Sunni or Shiite roots.
"They want to take an idea that was supposed to unite the city and express the things that divide us," said Badran, now a professor at the Fine Arts College in northern Baghdad.
City officials have tried to clamp down on overt sectarian symbols, but watching over the miles of blast walls borders on impossible. The best they can do is appeal for reconciliation.
"This is the year of reconstruction. This is the year of building," said Tahseen al-Sheikhly, civilian spokesman for Baghdad security operations.
For now, most of the paintings on blast walls are apolitical, portraying themes on the region's past as Mesopotamia, the Sumarian and Assyrian cultures, Baghdad's place as an intellectual heart of the medieval Islamic world.
Others show the fabled Hanging Gardens of Babylon, one of the seven wonders of the ancient world, and ziggurats, the terraced temple towers that once dotted the Mesopotamian valley.
Still others depict stylized scenes from Arab myths and literature — Scheherazad's tales is a favorite subject — or wild nature like galloping Arabian horses or boats on the Tigris River.
Remarkably, none of the murals appears to have suffered any significant vandalism or the type of graffiti seen on naked blast walls, such as the scrawled slogans and advertisements for businesses hidden behind the concrete barriers.
One barber tried to lure customers with a ditty that rhymes in Arabic: "Jump and you will find me."
The hands-off aura around the murals could be fear of the Iraqi security patrols or America's aerial surveillance. Badran likes to think it's respect.
"People know these murals represent a kind of hope," he said. "So why would they ruin them? That's like saying they don't want things to improve."
Qasim Sabti, who runs one of Baghdad's best-known art galleries, said he encouraged about 20 young artists to join the mural effort in the early stages, and he denounces the attempt to push sectarian images.
"It is absolutely rejected by any respectful artist," Sabti said. "We, as a community of artists, refuse this."
----END-----
This is the barber graffiti, it's really clever:
In comparison, here's some other apartheid wall murals, this is Dansky's, a British artist on the Palestinian-Israeli wall:
Monday, July 21, 2008
Memoirs of Ahmed al-Katib -4-
The moment we stepped foot in Iran, we realized the diversity of opinion and movements, we took note in the fact that the official Iranian position during the reign of Mr. Mahdi Bazragan's government favored normalized relations with Iraq, affirming the 1975 Algiers agreement. Iranian foreign minister Mr. Ibrahim Yazdi went to the Iraqi embassy on the 17th of July to congratulate them in the anniversary of the "Revolution", as the Iraqi opposition, we wanted Iran to support us and to form the launch point of our revolution in Iraq, and so we needed to re-educate the Iranian public opinion, which held a positive view of the Ba'ath regime, considering that it was the only country that sheltered revolution's leader Imam Khomeini for fifteen years, and lending the opposition a Persian-speaking radio station, in spite of the fact that the regime pressured the Imam in his last months there which led to his departure. To achieve our goal we wrote articles against dictatorship in Iraq, we launched protests on the anniversary of the 17th of July Revolution, all this caused Saddam Hussein to complain to the Iranian foreign minister Yazdi upon meeting him at the Non-Aligned Conference in Havana, he requested the execution of the editor-in-chief of the Martyr Magazine which published a caricature of Saddam when he assumed his new post, Yazdi apologized and said that the magazine is not controlled by the government in light of new democratic atmosphere in Iran.
In cooperation with our friends at the Revolutionary Guard, we started to install military bases on the borders, to ease the entry of our elements from/into Iraq, a fellow fighter (martyr Talib al-Ulayli) insisted on launching military activity within Iraq, we haven't made our decision yet, but he went without our consultation or notification. He attacked Ba'ath Party cadres in Kerbala on the night of Ashoura, and then others in the military branch attempted to assassinate Tariq Aziz in al-Mustansiriya University. A certain "Khalid" attacked the ceremony they made for the victims of the explosion, under orders from leadership of the Islamic Labour, we adopted the two operations from Tehran(?). I read from reports that came from our friends in Iraq, that this "Khalid" was exceptionally brave, he was good at impersonating security men, once he went to a hall where Taha Yassin Ramadhan was supposed to be present, and he began bossing the personnel around like a true commander, he stood behind the podium awaiting the minister, but he didn't show up. Everyone thought Khalid was a hero, however, I suspected that he was a regime infiltrator in our midst, and he surely served the regime greatly when he attacked the mourners in the name of the Islamic Labor and/or Iran.
All this led the Iraqi regime to wage war and prepare for it by deporting Iraqis of Iranian origin, who were suspected of being loyal to the Iranian Revolution, about 50,000 were deported from all around Iraq. Mohammed al-Shirazi called to form an army out of these deported youth and to attack Iraq, thus was "The Islamic Revolutionary Army for Iraq's Liberation" was formed, causing furhter arrests on part of the Iraqi regime.
The Iraqi Revolutionary Army was formed in coordination with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, I became a member of its political leadership, which was formed out of all sorts of opposition Iraqi parties in Iran, as representive of the Islamic Labor Organization, the army was supervised by Sayyid Mahdi al-Hashimi, alongside Sheikh Mohammed al-Muntadhiri.
The Iraqi regime attacked Iran in the 22nd of September, 1980.
We found in war a new opportunity to topple the Iraqi regime that we couldn't shake through media, we expected that the Iraqi army would revolt against Saddam who put him through a meaningless war against their brothers in the Shi'i Islamic Iran. We even began to pack and prepare to return. As the war turned fiercer, the Iranians achieved victories, Imam Khomeini insisted on going the whole nine yards and topple Saddam, refusing all sorts of international dialog. Our hopes were furhter soaring, and we intensified our cooperation with the Iranian army, some even went to fight alongside the Iranians against the Iraqi army, as it is a war in defense of "Islam and the Revolution" against the "Infidel Baathist" regime.
I wrote at the time a book in which I attempted to criticize the Iraqi Islamic movement and the religious Marja'iyya, in particular al-Shirazi's peaceful movement, identifying its strengths and weaknesses, and hoping for the support of the Marja'iyya and Vilayet-e-Faqih in Iraq in the future.
ROAMING MISSIONARY
By 1982, the Iraqi-Iranian war took on a terrible, bloody meaninglessness. Sayyid Shirazi rallied to stop it, saying it's a dead-end, he urged movement members to get out of Iran. I preferred to leave the movement and to finish my religious studies, neglected since I left out of Iraq.
in 1985, Sayyid al-Mudarrisi invited me to teach in the Hawza of al-Imam al-Qa'im, which included students from the Gulf, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, it was more like an activist school and not a traditional hawza, as students mixed jurisprudence and legal teachings with party activity and various tasks and duties.
after the fall of Jafar al-Numairi's regime in Sudan, we decided to open a branch of our movement in Sudan, I travelled to Khartom via Syria and Cairo, I studied for forty days there, during which I managed to get into contact with a number of college students, some of which I managed to convert into Shi'ism. Those invited me to hold dialog with their Salafist Wahhabi friends, I went there and talked through the night, by morning I managed to convert some of them.
Having formed a Shi'i nucleus we bought some of them to the Qa'immiya Hawza so that they may form the beginning of a Shi'i movement in Sudan, the Iranian government had nothing to do with any of this.
NEXT: TURNING POINT
Sunday, July 20, 2008
How Osama Bin Laden Influenced Architecture
Six months ago, I entered a music shop asking for an oud, the nice old owner with a not-so-nice mouth hygiene asked:
"What kind of oud?"
"The cheapest."
He pointed at some wretched instrument hung above his head in an array of other ouds, it wasn't that bad actually, but the ones next to it rendered it in an abysmal light.
"So how much is this?"
"oh, about 100 dollars"
"and this is made where?"
"Syria."
I was surprised. "What about the Iraqi ones?"
"Oh, those are really expensive."
That was one of the best things I heard this year and probably the few ones to come. as an Iraqi born in 1985, it's common sense that engaging the word 'Iraqi' in any sort of product = usually rear-end results. That Iraqis are actually world-class at something gave me a sense of power and fulfillment I seldom felt, for a brief second I wondered what Americans must feel like having their brands plastered all over the world.
Aside from Oud crafstmanship, world-famous Iraqi architect Zaha Hadid is also one of the very few things in any number of parallel universes that could make me honestly beam in pride. and she ain't the regular by-the-numbers architect either, she is possessed with one nasty Djinni. Her ideas are zany and impossible, and make you feel futuristic albeit soulful.
Looking at this upcoming project of hers in Dubai, I was fascinated for a few moments by the sheer boldness of this concept before bursting out laughing. She's calling them "Dancing Towers" - as if they were influenced by some Pixar kiddie musical number! yeah, right. For Ali's sake, it even has room for your occasional hijacked plane to pass through - Try and blow this up, Ossy! This idea wouldn't have existed had it not been for the inspiration of that crazy man in Taliban, they should write his name on a plaque nearby. Maybe he'd attend the ceremony and use it to test drive any future engagements that might involve airplanes.
NOTE: This is a real project. Walla.






